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THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND
AN ETHICAL IDEAL OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE
OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE
Robert F. Ladenson /
In this paper I want to identify and describe a major
ethical issue for administrative law judges. The issue
concerns circumstances of the institutional background of
most administrative law adjudication that tend to make it
difficult for administrative law judges to fulfill their
judicial responsibilities in a way they themselves consider
meaningful. The issue is familiar, perhaps all too familiar,
to many administrative law judges. I think, however, that
my approach to the issue, which draws heavily upon moral and
jurisprudential philosophy, may bring out some of its
important aspects that are often overlooked.
Administrative law judges face many of the same problems
of other employees in large organizations. They may, at
times, find themselves subject to arbitrary salary and
promotion decisions, or to unfair discipline. In some
circumstances they may have reason to fear retaliation for
speaking candidly to superiors within the administrative
hierarchy. Situations may arise where they have knowledge
of grossly inappropriate behavior by superiors or associates,
but no way to bring this to light without placing their
careers in jeopardy.
In addition to facing the above problems, however,
administrative law judges also confront a unique difficulty
in virtue of their judicial role. With depressing regularity,
administrative law judges see their decisions overturned by
superiors who completely, or almost completely, ignore the
legal reasoning upon which the judges based their decisions.
This situation raises a deep ethical problem that goes
beyond the issues of due process, workplace free speech, and
whistleblowing that arise generally for employees in large
organizations. The problem concerns basic ideals toward
which anyone who takes the judicial role seriously should
aspire.
Before analyzing this problem in depth, it helps for
understanding its nature as an ethical problem to focus
I/ Department of Humanities, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1riefly upon an important distincticr. in moral philosophy.
There are two distinct conceptions of ethics that have
played important roles in western philosophy and which
correspond to important asp ts of the way in which most
people think about ethics. - One need not feel compelled
to make a judgment about which of these two conceptions is
Euperior, all things considered. Each provides special
illumination with respect to different areas of human
ethical experience. The two conceptions thus may be thought
cf as complementary, rather than as opposed to one another.
The first conception, which one may term "ethics as
morality", treats ethics as fundamentally concerned with
interpersonal conduct. Under this conception, ethics
consists, at its core, of a set of rules that apply to human
beings over the totality of their inter-relationships with
one another, and which take precedence over all other rules.
"he basic moral rules, according to ethics as morality, such
as "Do not kill", "Do not cause pain", "Do not deceive", "Do
not cheat", "Keep your promises", and so forth, forbid
various kinds of behavior causing severe harm to others or
substantially incresing the likelihood that others will
suffer grave harm. - The American Bar Association Code of
Professional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct
both exemplify the conception of ethics as morality insofar
as they apply the above kinds of rules to circumstances of
professional conduct for attorneys and judges, respectively.
The second conception of ethics, which one may term
ethics as the quest for a good life, has a fundamentally
different emphasis from ethics as morality. Ethics as the
quest for a good life does not allot a critical role to the
idea of a code of moral conduct that defines the basic
obligations of human beings. Instead, it focuses upon the
very different idea of flourishing, or fulfillment for the
2/ For a useful discussion of the two conceptions of
ethics to be described, see Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of
]Law (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964) pp. 3-30.
3/ The ethical theories of philosophers such as Hobbes,
Kant, and Mill, however different from one another, all
exemplify the conception of ethics as morality. For a
recent philosophical theory clearly illustrating this
conception, see Bernard Gert, The Moral Rules (New York,
Harper and Row, 1970).
human individual; that is to say, the ends, or values to be
sought in a genujnely good human life, and the means for
realizing them. -
When administrative law judges have their decisions
regularly overturned by superiors who ignore the legal
reasoning upon which the judges base their decisions, a deep
ethical problem arises from the standpoint of ethics as the
quest for a good life, a problem that concerns the ideals to
be sought after in a genuinely fulfilling professional life
for an administrative law judge. Any judge who takes the
judicial role seriously must identify in a strong way with
the ideal of fidelity to the rule of the law. Administrative
law judges who identify with this ideal, however, confront
severe difficulties when seeing their decisions overturned
in disregard of the legal reasoning they put forward to
support those decisions.
A clear and illuminating statement of these difficulties
requires one to analyze first the ideal of fidelity to the
rule of law itself in some detail. To begin, this ideal is
separate and independent from the ideal of doing justice,
interpreted in a purely result-oriented manner. Even if the
decision in a given case accorded with very widely shared
intuitive ideas about fairness, nonetheless I think that
anyone who takes the judicial role seriously would feel an
important ideal had been undermined if the decision maker
resolved the case in a way that disregarded legal reasoning
that was relevant to it.
One cannot, however, equate the ideal of fidelity to
the rule of law with the notion of "strict construction";
that is, of non-deviating adherence to precedent and statute.
Difficult cases, and even many not so difficult cases,
require a judge to go well beyond the range within which
precedent and statute provide unambiguous guidance. The
problem of explicating the nature of the ideal of fidelity
4/ The clearest and historically most important example of
a philosophical work that exemplifies the conception of
ethics as the quest for a good life is Aristotle's
Nichomachean Ethics.
:o the rule of law relates to perennial issues about the
iature of the judicial process, issues stated clearly by
'ardozo:
What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what
sources of information do I appeal for guidance? In
what proportions do I permit them to contribute to the
result? In what proportions ought they to contribute?
If a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse to
follow it? If no precedent is applicable, how do I
reach the rule that will make a precedent for the
future? If I am seeking logical consistency, the
symmetry of the legal structure, how far shall I seek
it? At what point shall the quest be halted by some
discrepant custom, by some consideration of social
welfare, by N own or the common standards of justice
and morals? -
Cardozo's questions clearly lie beyond the scope of
this paper. They define one major province of jurispruden-
tial philosophy. I want to focus, however, on one aspect of
these questions that has a special pertinence for understand-
ing the ideal of fidelity to the rule of law. Cardozo's
quotation rightly presupposes a conception of judicial
reasoning as a complex intellectual activity, bringing into
play the abilities of analysis and synthesis, and also
inevitably providing considerable scope for the exercise of
independent judgment by the judge; that is, judgment from
the standpoint of a judge's own social vision and sense of
justice. A problem arises, however, of how to reconcile
such a conception with the ideal of fidelity to the rule of
law and not of men and women.
To state the problem another way, under the ideal of
fidelity to the rule of law, one regards the law as a
constraint upon the scope within which a judge may inject
his or her independent social vision and personal sense of
justice into the process of making a judicial decision. On
the other hand, under any reasonable account of the judicial
decision-making process, the social vision and personal
sense of justice of a judge enter into the process in many
important ways. The problem is how to reconcile these two
points of view which both exert a pull upon us, but which
pull in opposed directions.
/ Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process
(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1921) p. 10.
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In his recent book, entitled Law's Empire, Ronald Dworkin6
provides a highly illuminating approach to the above problem.
Dworkin begins, in effect, by underscoring the conception of
judicial reasoning as a complex and profound intellectual
activity, implicit in the above quoted words of Cardozo. In
this regard, Dworkin draws an analogy between judging and
literary criticism. Judges and literary critics alike deal
with texts whose overall meanings are substantially undeter-
mined by their exact words. For this reason, both judges
and literary critics confront problems of interpretation
that call for a theoretical approach which brings a diversity
of elements to one's understanding of a text, such as
history, philosophy, politics, religion, and psychology.
Dworkin notes, however, that the analogy between judging and
literary criticism breaks down in a crucial respect. The
judge not only interprets law, but also makes it. That is
to say, a judge's interpretation of the body of law in a
jurisdiction, as it applies to a particular case, becomes
part of that body of law for judges to interpret in the
future. The judge, notes Dworkin, is like a critic, but
like an author as well.
To continue the analogy between judging and literary
activity, Dworkin thus introduces the idea of an imaginary
literary genre, which he calls the chain novel. In a chain
novel a number of different authors write its chapters one
after another. In this respect chain novels resemble
television soap operas and story games played around a
campfire. Unlike soap operas and story games, however, each
of the authors of a chain novel takes the enterprise seriously.
Chain novelists view themselves as responsible to continue
the novel, at the respective points where they begin writing,
in a way that makes the novel the best it can be as a
literary artwork.
Continuing a chain novel thus requires an author to
develop a conception of how the novel, as written up to a
given point, hangs together, how its elements such as plot,
development of characters, narrative style, imagery, symbolism,
and so forth cohere with one another. Such a conception, in
turn, depends upon developing an overall interpretation of
the novel, of its main themes and underlying aesthetic
6/ (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1986) The
following discussion draws upon chapters six and eleven
of Law's Empire, entitled, respectively, "Integrity" and
"Integrity in Law".
;tructure. Dworkin notes that overall interpretations of a
iovel have two dimensions of evaluation, which he terms,
:espectively, fit and soundness.
The dimension of fit concerns how well posited hypotheses
ibout theme and aesthetic structure harmonize and make sense
)f the novel so that the chain novelist can continue it in a
qay that makes it the best it can be. Dworkin employs a
striking example to illustrate how considerations of fit
serve to select between different hypotheses about the theme
of a chain novel. Dworkin invites us to suppose that
Charles Dickens' A Christmas Carol has been written, as a
chain novel, and a given author in the chain must write the
last chapter. Consider a choice at this point between the
following two hypotheses concerning the overall theme of
Dickens' A Christmas Carol. Under the first hypothesis,
A Christmas Carol illustrates that although liable to
corruption under the economic institutions of capitalism,
human beings have a fundamentally good nature. By contrast,
the second hypothesis views A Christmas Carol as expressing
a conception of human nature as inherently evil. Which
hypothesis should a chain novelist choose as a standpoint
from which to write the final chapter of A Christmas Carol?
Recall that by the beginning of the last chapter Scrooge has
already had his dream, repented, bought the Cratchett family
a turkey, and so forth. These aspects of the plot, as it
has unfolded up to the last chapter, would appear to rule
out the second of the above hypotheses categorically.
Suppose, however, that a chain novelist had to write
the second, rather than the last chapter of A Christmas Carol.
At this stage considerations of fit cannot select unequivocally
between the above two hypotheses. Under this circumstance,
soundness, the second dimension for evaluating overall
interpretation of a chain novel, comes into play. Soundness
concerns the chain novelist's independent artistic judgments,
as determined, among other ways, by his or her outlook on
life, personal value judgments, and so forth. In some cases
two or more interpretations may appear to fit the novel
equally well, and so the chain novelist, taking seriously
the charge to help make the novel the best it can be,
proceeds from the standpoint of his or her independent
aesthetic outlook.
Dworkin invites us to conceive of the judicial ideal of
fidelity to the rule of law on analogy with the chain novel.
According to Dworkin, judges should "identify legal rights
and duties so far as possible on the assumption that they
were created by a single author, the community personified,44
expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness". :
/
As with the chain novelist, notes Dworkin, ideally speaking,
a judge brings an interpretative theory to the adjudication
of cases in order to further the development of the law so
as to make it the best it can be. Furthermore, as with
chain novels, such a theory can be evaluated from the
standpoints of fit and soundness. Fit concerns the degree
to which an interpretative theory effects coherence among
the diverse sources of law such as statutes, case law,
general principles of law, and so forth. The dimension of
substance comes into play when considerations of fit cannot
discriminate between two or more interpretations of some
statute or line of cases. When this occurs, Dworkin asserts,
the judge must choose between eligible interpretations by
asking which of them is superior from the standpoint of a
social vision or conception of justice with which the judge
identifies.
Judicial reasoning, according to Dworkin's account,
thus accords a large role to the independent judgment of
judges. This role, however, is limited by a responsibility
to decide cases from the standpoint of an intellectual
approach which aims to discover coherence among the diverse
sources of law and to bring them to bear upon cases in a way
that promotes development of the law toward the best it can
be. All of this undoubtedly seems very much up in the
clouds. Such, however, is as it should be. The purpose of
Dworkin's analysis is not to describe what a typical judge
actually does in deciding a case. Rather, Dworkin seeks to
identify the most important ideals that should inform our
conception of the judicial role. Dworkin designates his
approach with the highly apt title of "law as integrity".
Dworkin thus provides, in essence, a procedural, as
opposed to a substantive, account of the idea of fidelity to
the rule of law. Fidelity of the rule of law in a given
case cannot be analyzed as reaching the result absolutely
demanded by the law. In difficult cases, or even in not so
difficult cases, the law makes no such absolute demands.
For Dworkin, judges express fidelity to the rule of law when
they adopt the standpoint of law as integrity; that is, when
they decide cases by "trying to find, in some coherent set
of principles about people's rights and duties, the best
constructive interpretation of the political structure and
7/ Ibid, p. 225.
legal doctrine of their community". V Law as integrity
thus requires a judge "to test his interpretation of any
part of the great network of political structures and
decisions of his community by asking whether it could form
part of 5/coherent theory justifying the network as a
whole". -
The foregoing account of the ideal of fidelity to the
rule of law in terms of Dworkin's notion of law as integrity
throws an illuminating light on the issue raised at the
outset of this paper. That is, it provides a deeper under-
standing of why disregard by superiors of the legal reasoning
behind an administrative law judge's decision cuts deep
ethically, when one views professional ethics from the
standpoint of the quest for a meaningful and fulfilling
professional life. The more an administrative law judge has
his or her decisions overturned in disregard of the judicial
reasoning that went into them, the more difficult it becomes
to conceive of himself or herself as a professional jurist
essentially engaged in the kind of complex and profound
intellectual activity called for by identification with the
ideal of fidelity to the rule of law, when understood in
terms of Dworkin's conception of law as integrity. As such,
the administrative law judge works under conditions that, on
a continuing basis, tend to undermine his or her sense of
professional self-esteem.
Furthermore, taking the ideal of fidelity to the rule
of law seriously, involves more for a judge than just
adopting the conception of law as integrity as a personal
approach to reaching judicial decisions. He or she also
must have an abiding concern that the judicial process, of
which his or her decisions are a part, makes sense, considered
as a whole from the point of view of law as integrity, and
thus expresses respect for the ideal of fidelity to the rule
of law. A process in which judges find their decisions
regularly overturned in disregard of the legal reasoning
that underlies them cannot be reconciled easily with the
conception of law as integrity. For this reason, an adminis-
trative law judge, with a strong sense of the ideals of the
judicial role, works under conditions which tend to produce
a chronic sense of frustration.
8/ Ibid, p. 255.
9/ Ibid, p. 245.
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There are thus major ethical issues for administrative
law judges from the standpoint of professional ethics,
conceived of as the quest for a good or meaningful profes-
sional life. Aspects of the organizational context in which
an administrative law judge functions, aspects not easily
altered, have a tendency to undermine the administrative law
judge's sense of professional self-esteem and tend to create
a sense of frustration for administrative law judges who
take the ideals of the judicial role seriously.
The above observations inevitably lead one to ask what
can be done. As noted at the outset, this paper simply aims
to identify and describe an important ethical issue for
administrative law judges. It does not propose solutions.
I do not think, however, that one should view the paper as
deficient for this reason. The paper concerns circumstances
that hinder the realization of an important professional
ideal for administrative law judges. Professional ideals
resemble personal ideals in a critical respect. Questions
of what personal ideals with which to identify in the quest
for a good life, and how to realize them, cannot be answered
by one individual for another individual. By the same
token, I think that similar questions about professional
ideals can only be addressed by the members of a given
profession either as individuals or on a collective basis.
In this regard, unquestionably much dialogue bearing upon
the issues raised in this paper has occurred among adminis-
trative law judges at national conferences, in the pages of
the Journal of the Nationhl Association of Administrative
Law Judoes, and other places as well. This paper aims not
to provide direct guidance with respect to the many issues
raised in such a continuing dialogue. By contrast, it seeks
to clarify and illuminate one important ideal implicated in
those issues, which makes the issues significant for adminis-
trative law judges not only from a practical standpoint, but
from an ethical point of view as well.
